‘I wasn’t angry,’ said Barnet. ‘I saw an immense selfishness, a
monstrous disregard for anything but pleasure and possession in all
those people above us, but I saw how inevitable that was, how certainly
if the richest had changed places with the poorest, that things would
have been the same. What else can happen when men use science and every
new thing that science gives, and all their available intelligence and
energy to manufacture wealth and appliances, and leave government and
education to the rustling traditions of hundreds of years ago? Those
traditions come from the dark ages when there was really not enough for
every one, when life was a fierce struggle that might be masked but
could not be escaped. Of course this famine grabbing, this fierce
dispossession of others, must follow from such a disharmony between
material and training. Of course the rich were vulgar and the poor grew
savage and every added power that came to men made the rich richer and
the poor less necessary and less free. The men I met in the casual
wards and the relief offices were all smouldering for revolt, talking
of justice and injustice and revenge. I saw no hope in that talk, nor
in anything but patience....’
But he did not mean a passive patience. He meant that the method of
social reconstruction was still a riddle, that no effectual
rearrangement was possible until this riddle in all its tangled aspects
was solved. ‘I tried to talk to those discontented men,’ he wrote, ‘but
it was hard for them to see things as I saw them. When I talked of
patience and the larger scheme, they answered, “But then we shall all
be dead”—and I could not make them see, what is so simple to my own
mind, that that did not affect the question. Men who think in lifetimes
are of no use to statesmanship.’
He does not seem to have seen a newspaper during those wanderings, and
a chance sight of the transparency of a kiosk in the market-place at
Bishop’s Stortford announcing a ‘Grave International Situation’ did not
excite him very much. There had been so many grave international
situations in recent years.
This time it was talk of the Central European powers suddenly attacking
the Slav Confederacy, with France and England going to the help of the
Slavs.
But the next night he found a tolerable meal awaiting the vagrants in
the casual ward, and learnt from the workhouse master that all
serviceable trained men were to be sent back on the morrow to their
mobilisation centres. The country was on the eve of war. He was to go
back through London to Surrey. His first feeling, he records, was one
of extreme relief that his days of ‘hopeless battering at the underside
of civilisation’ were at an end. Here was something definite to do,
something definitely provided for. But his relief was greatly modified
when he found that the mobilisation arrangements had been made so
hastily and carelessly that for nearly thirty-six hours at the
improvised depôt at Epsom he got nothing either to eat or to drink but
a cup of cold water. The depôt was absolutely unprovisioned, and no one
was free to leave it.
CHAPTER THE SECOND
THE LAST WAR
Section I
Viewed from the standpoint of a sane and ambitious social order, it is
difficult to understand, and it would be tedious to follow, the motives
that plunged mankind into the war that fills the histories of the
middle decades of the twentieth century.
It must always be remembered that the political structure of the world
at that time was everywhere extraordinarily behind the collective
intelligence. That is the central fact of that history. For two hundred
years there had been no great changes in political or legal methods and
pretensions, the utmost change had been a certain shifting of
boundaries and slight readjustment of procedure, while in nearly every
other aspect of life there had been fundamental revolutions, gigantic
releases, and an enormous enlargement of scope and outlook. The
absurdities of courts and the indignities of representative
parliamentary government, coupled with the opening of vast fields of
opportunity in other directions, had withdrawn the best intelligences
more and more from public affairs. The ostensible governments of the
world in the twentieth century were following in the wake of the
ostensible religions. They were ceasing to command the services of any
but second-rate men. After the middle of the eighteenth century there
are no more great ecclesiastics upon the world’s memory, after the
opening of the twentieth no more statesmen. Everywhere one finds an
energetic, ambitious, short-sighted, common-place type in the seats of
authority, blind to the new possibilities and litigiously reliant upon
the traditions of the past.
Perhaps the most dangerous of those outworn traditions were the
boundaries of the various ‘sovereign states,’ and the conception of a
general predominance in human affairs on the part of some one
particular state. The memory of the empires of Rome and Alexander
squatted, an unlaid carnivorous ghost, in the human imagination—it
bored into the human brain like some grisly parasite and filled it with
disordered thoughts and violent impulses. For more than a century the
French system exhausted its vitality in belligerent convulsions, and
then the infection passed to the German-speaking peoples who were the
heart and centre of Europe, and from them onward to the Slavs. Later
ages were to store and neglect the vast insane literature of this
obsession, the intricate treaties, the secret agreements, the infinite
knowingness of the political writer, the cunning refusals to accept
plain facts, the strategic devices, the tactical manœuvres, the records
of mobilisations and counter-mobilisations. It ceased to be credible
almost as soon as it ceased to happen, but in the very dawn of the new
age their state craftsmen sat with their historical candles burning,
and, in spite of strange, new reflections and unfamiliar lights and
shadows, still wrangling and planning to rearrange the maps of Europe
and the world.
It was to become a matter for subtle inquiry how far the millions of
men and women outside the world of these specialists sympathised and
agreed with their portentous activities. One school of psychologists
inclined to minimise this participation, but the balance of evidence
goes to show that there were massive responses to these suggestions of
the belligerent schemer. Primitive man had been a fiercely combative
animal; innumerable generations had passed their lives in tribal
warfare, and the weight of tradition, the example of history, the
ideals of loyalty and devotion fell in easily enough with the
incitements of the international mischief-maker. The political ideas of
the common man were picked up haphazard, there was practically nothing
in such education as he was given that was ever intended to fit him for
citizenship as such (that conception only appeared, indeed, with the
development of Modern State ideas), and it was therefore a
comparatively easy matter to fill his vacant mind with the sounds and
fury of exasperated suspicion and national aggression.
For example, Barnet describes the London crowd as noisily patriotic
when presently his battalion came up from the depôt to London, to
entrain for the French frontier. He tells of children and women and
lads and old men cheering and shouting, of the streets and rows hung
with the flags of the Allied Powers, of a real enthusiasm even among
the destitute and unemployed. The Labour Bureaux were now partially
transformed into enrolment offices, and were centres of hotly patriotic
excitement. At every convenient place upon the line on either side of
the Channel Tunnel there were enthusiastic spectators, and the feeling
in the regiment, if a little stiffened and darkened by grim
anticipations, was none the less warlike.
But all this emotion was the fickle emotion of minds without
established ideas; it was with most of them, Barnet says, as it was
with himself, a natural response to collective movement, and to martial
sounds and colours, and the exhilarating challenge of vague dangers.
And people had been so long oppressed by the threat of and preparation
for war that its arrival came with an effect of positive relief.
Section 2
The plan of campaign of the Allies assigned the defence of the lower
Meuse to the English, and the troop-trains were run direct from the
various British depôts to the points in the Ardennes where they were
intended to entrench themselves.
Most of the documents bearing upon the campaign were destroyed during
the war, from the first the scheme of the Allies seems to have been
confused, but it is highly probable that the formation of an aerial
park in this region, from which attacks could be made upon the vast
industrial plant of the lower Rhine, and a flanking raid through
Holland upon the German naval establishments at the mouth of the Elbe,
were integral parts of the original project. Nothing of this was known
to such pawns in the game as Barnet and his company, whose business it
was to do what they were told by the mysterious intelligences at the
direction of things in Paris, to which city the Whitehall staff had
also been transferred. From first to last these directing intelligences
remained mysterious to the body of the army, veiled under the name of
‘Orders.’ There was no Napoleon, no Cæsar to embody enthusiasm. Barnet
says, ‘We talked of Them. _They_ are sending us up into Luxembourg.
_They_ are going to turn the Central European right.’
Behind the veil of this vagueness the little group of more or less
worthy men which constituted Headquarters was beginning to realise the
enormity of the thing it was supposed to control....
In the great hall of the War Control, whose windows looked out across
the Seine to the Trocadero and the palaces of the western quarter, a
series of big-scale relief maps were laid out upon tables to display
the whole seat of war, and the staff-officers of the control were
continually busy shifting the little blocks which represented the
contending troops, as the reports and intelligence came drifting in to
the various telegraphic bureaux in the adjacent rooms. In other smaller
apartments there were maps of a less detailed sort, upon which, for
example, the reports of the British Admiralty and of the Slav
commanders were recorded as they kept coming to hand. Upon these maps,
as upon chessboards, Marshal Dubois, in consultation with General Viard
and the Earl of Delhi, was to play the great game for world supremacy
against the Central European powers. Very probably he had a definite
idea of his game; very probably he had a coherent and admirable plan.
But he had reckoned without a proper estimate either of the new
strategy of aviation or of the possibilities of atomic energy that
Holsten had opened for mankind. While he planned entrenchments and
invasions and a frontier war, the Central European generalship was
striking at the eyes and the brain. And while, with a certain diffident
hesitation, he developed his gambit that night upon the lines laid down
by Napoleon and Moltke, his own scientific corps in a state of mutinous
activity was preparing a blow for Berlin. ‘These old fools!’ was the
key in which the scientific corps was thinking.
The War Control in Paris, on the night of July the second, was an
impressive display of the paraphernalia of scientific military
organisation, as the first half of the twentieth century understood it.
To one human being at least the consulting commanders had the likeness
of world-wielding gods.
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『The World Set Free』
H. G. (Herbert George) Wells
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