There in a stuffy court in London, a grimy oblong box of a room, during
the exceptional heat of the May of 1956, the leading counsel of the day
argued and shouted over a miserable little matter of more royalties or
less and whether the Dass-Tata company might not bar the
Holsten-Roberts’ methods of utilising the new power. The Dass-Tata
people were indeed making a strenuous attempt to secure a world
monopoly in atomic engineering. The judge, after the manner of those
times, sat raised above the court, wearing a preposterous gown and a
foolish huge wig, the counsel also wore dirty-looking little wigs and
queer black gowns over their usual costume, wigs and gowns that were
held to be necessary to their pleading, and upon unclean wooden benches
stirred and whispered artful-looking solicitors, busily scribbling
reporters, the parties to the case, expert witnesses, interested
people, and a jostling confusion of subpoenaed persons, briefless young
barristers (forming a style on the most esteemed and truculent
examples) and casual eccentric spectators who preferred this pit of
iniquity to the free sunlight outside. Every one was damply hot, the
examining King’s Counsel wiped the perspiration from his huge,
clean-shaven upper lip; and into this atmosphere of grasping contention
and human exhalations the daylight filtered through a window that was
manifestly dirty. The jury sat in a double pew to the left of the
judge, looking as uncomfortable as frogs that have fallen into an
ash-pit, and in the witness-box lied the would-be omnivorous Dass,
under cross-examination....
Holsten had always been accustomed to publish his results so soon as
they appeared to him to be sufficiently advanced to furnish a basis for
further work, and to that confiding disposition and one happy flash of
adaptive invention the alert Dass owed his claim....
But indeed a vast multitude of such sharp people were clutching,
patenting, pre-empting, monopolising this or that feature of the new
development, seeking to subdue this gigantic winged power to the
purposes of their little lusts and avarice. That trial is just one of
innumerable disputes of the same kind. For a time the face of the world
festered with patent legislation. It chanced, however, to have one
oddly dramatic feature in the fact that Holsten, after being kept
waiting about the court for two days as a beggar might have waited at a
rich man’s door, after being bullied by ushers and watched by
policemen, was called as a witness, rather severely handled by counsel,
and told not to ‘quibble’ by the judge when he was trying to be
absolutely explicit.
The judge scratched his nose with a quill pen, and sneered at Holsten’s
astonishment round the corner of his monstrous wig. Holsten was a great
man, was he? Well, in a law-court great men were put in their places.
‘We want to know has the plaintiff added anything to this or hasn’t
he?’ said the judge, ‘we don’t want to have your views whether Sir
Philip Dass’s improvements were merely superficial adaptations or
whether they were implicit in your paper. No doubt—after the manner of
inventors—you think most things that were ever likely to be discovered
are implicit in your papers. No doubt also you think too that most
subsequent additions and modifications are merely superficial.
Inventors have a way of thinking that. The law isn’t concerned with
that sort of thing. The law has nothing to do with the vanity of
inventors. The law is concerned with the question whether these patent
rights have the novelty the plantiff claims for them. What that
admission may or may not stop, and all these other things you are
saying in your overflowing zeal to answer more than the questions
addressed to you—none of these things have anything whatever to do with
the case in hand. It is a matter of constant astonishment to me in this
court to see how you scientific men, with all your extraordinary claims
to precision and veracity, wander and wander so soon as you get into
the witness-box. I know no more unsatisfactory class of witness. The
plain and simple question is, has Sir Philip Dass made any real
addition to existing knowledge and methods in this matter or has he
not? We don’t want to know whether they were large or small additions
nor what the consequences of your admission may be. That you will leave
to us.’
Holsten was silent.
‘Surely?’ said the judge, almost pityingly.
‘No, he hasn’t,’ said Holsten, perceiving that for once in his life he
must disregard infinitesimals.
‘Ah!’ said the judge, ‘now why couldn’t you say that when counsel put
the question? . . .’
An entry in Holsten’s diary-autobiography, dated five days later, runs:
‘Still amazed. The law is the most dangerous thing in this country. It
is hundreds of years old. It hasn’t an idea. The oldest of old bottles
and this new wine, the most explosive wine. Something will overtake
them.’
Section 4
There was a certain truth in Holsten’s assertion that the law was
‘hundreds of years old.’ It was, in relation to current thought and
widely accepted ideas, an archaic thing. While almost all the material
and methods of life had been changing rapidly and were now changing
still more rapidly, the law-courts and the legislatures of the world
were struggling desperately to meet modern demands with devices and
procedures, conceptions of rights and property and authority and
obligation that dated from the rude compromises of relatively barbaric
times. The horse-hair wigs and antic dresses of the British judges,
their musty courts and overbearing manners, were indeed only the
outward and visible intimations of profounder anachronisms. The legal
and political organisation of the earth in the middle twentieth century
was indeed everywhere like a complicated garment, outworn yet strong,
that now fettered the governing body that once it had protected.
Yet that same spirit of free-thinking and outspoken publication that in
the field of natural science had been the beginning of the conquest of
nature, was at work throughout all the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries preparing the spirit of the new world within the degenerating
body of the old. The idea of a greater subordination of individual
interests and established institutions to the collective future, is
traceable more and more clearly in the literature of those times, and
movement after movement fretted itself away in criticism of and
opposition to first this aspect and then that of the legal, social, and
political order. Already in the early nineteenth century Shelley, with
no scrap of alternative, is denouncing the established rulers of the
world as Anarchs, and the entire system of ideas and suggestions that
was known as Socialism, and more particularly its international side,
feeble as it was in creative proposals or any method of transition,
still witnesses to the growth of a conception of a modernised system of
inter-relationships that should supplant the existing tangle of
proprietary legal ideas.
The word ‘Sociology’ was invented by Herbert Spencer, a popular writer
upon philosophical subjects, who flourished about the middle of the
nineteenth century, but the idea of a state, planned as an
electric-traction system is planned, without reference to pre-existing
apparatus, upon scientific lines, did not take a very strong hold upon
the popular imagination of the world until the twentieth century. Then,
the growing impatience of the American people with the monstrous and
socially paralysing party systems that had sprung out of their absurd
electoral arrangements, led to the appearance of what came to be called
the ‘Modern State’ movement, and a galaxy of brilliant writers, in
America, Europe, and the East, stirred up the world to the thought of
bolder rearrangements of social interaction, property, employment,
education, and government, than had ever been contemplated before. No
doubt these Modern State ideas were very largely the reflection upon
social and political thought of the vast revolution in material things
that had been in progress for two hundred years, but for a long time
they seemed to be having no more influence upon existing institutions
than the writings of Rousseau and Voltaire seemed to have had at the
time of the death of the latter. They were fermenting in men’s minds,
and it needed only just such social and political stresses as the
coming of the atomic mechanisms brought about, to thrust them forward
abruptly into crude and startling realisation.
Section 5
Frederick Barnet’s _Wander Jahre_ is one of those autobiographical
novels that were popular throughout the third and fourth decades of the
twentieth century. It was published in 1970, and one must understand
Wander Jahre rather in a spiritual and intellectual than in a literal
sense. It is indeed an allusive title, carrying the world back to the
_Wilhelm Meister_ of Goethe, a century and a half earlier.
Its author, Frederick Barnet, gives a minute and curious history of his
life and ideas between his nineteenth and his twenty-third birthdays.
He was neither a very original nor a very brilliant man, but he had a
trick of circumstantial writing; and though no authentic portrait was
to survive for the information of posterity, he betrays by a score of
casual phrases that he was short, sturdy, inclined to be plump, with a
‘rather blobby’ face, and full, rather projecting blue eyes. He
belonged until the financial _débâcle_ of 1956 to the class of fairly
prosperous people, he was a student in London, he aeroplaned to Italy
and then had a pedestrian tour from Genoa to Rome, crossed in the air
to Greece and Egypt, and came back over the Balkans and Germany. His
family fortunes, which were largely invested in bank shares, coal
mines, and house property, were destroyed. Reduced to penury, he sought
to earn a living. He suffered great hardship, and was then caught up by
the war and had a year of soldiering, first as an officer in the
English infantry and then in the army of pacification. His book tells
all these things so simply and at the same time so explicitly, that it
remains, as it were, an eye by which future generations may have at
least one man’s vision of the years of the Great Change.
And he was, he tells us, a ‘Modern State’ man ‘by instinct’ from the
beginning. He breathed in these ideas in the class rooms and
laboratories of the Carnegie Foundation school that rose, a long and
delicately beautiful facade, along the South Bank of the Thames
opposite the ancient dignity of Somerset House. Such thought was
interwoven with the very fabric of that pioneer school in the
educational renascence in England. After the customary exchange years
in Heidelberg and Paris, he went into the classical school of London
University. The older so-called ‘classical’ education of the British
pedagogues, probably the most paralysing, ineffective, and foolish
routine that ever wasted human life, had already been swept out of this
great institution in favour of modern methods; and he learnt Greek and
Latin as well as he had learnt German, Spanish, and French, so that he
wrote and spoke them freely, and used them with an unconscious ease in
his study of the foundation civilisations of the European system to
which they were the key. (This change was still so recent that he
mentions an encounter in Rome with an ‘Oxford don’ who ‘spoke Latin
with a Wiltshire accent and manifest discomfort, wrote Greek letters
with his tongue out, and seemed to think a Greek sentence a charm when
it was a quotation and an impropriety when it wasn’t.’)
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『The World Set Free』
H. G. (Herbert George) Wells
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