Rabourdin’s plan divided the government into three ministries, or
departments. He thought that if the France of former days possessed
brains strong enough to comprehend in one system both foreign and
domestic affairs, the France of to-day was not likely to be without its
Mazarin, its Suger, its Sully, its de Choiseul, or its Colbert to
direct even vast administrative departments. Besides, constitutionally
speaking, three ministries will agree better than seven; and, in the
restricted number there is less chance for mistaken choice; moreover,
it might be that the kingdom would some day escape from those perpetual
ministerial oscillations which interfered with all plans of foreign
policy and prevented all ameliorations of home rule. In Austria, where
many diverse united nations present so many conflicting interests to
be conciliated and carried forward under one crown, two statesmen alone
bear the burden of public affairs and are not overwhelmed by it. Was
France less prolific of political capacities than Germany? The rather
silly game of what are called “constitutional institutions” carried
beyond bounds has ended, as everybody knows, in requiring a great many
offices to satisfy the multifarious ambition of the middle classes. It
seemed to Rabourdin, in the first place, natural to unite the ministry
of war with the ministry of the navy. To his thinking the navy was
one of the current expenses of the war department, like the artillery,
cavalry, infantry, and commissariat. Surely it was an absurdity to
give separate administrations to admirals and marshals when both were
employed to one end, namely, the defense of the nation, the overthrow of
an enemy, and the security of the national possessions. The ministry
of the interior ought in like manner to combine the departments of
commerce, police, and finances, or it belied its own name. To the
ministry of foreign affairs belonged the administration of justice, the
household of the king, and all that concerned arts, sciences, and belles
lettres. All patronage ought to flow directly from the sovereign. Such
ministries necessitated the supremacy of a council. Each required
the work of two hundred officials, and no more, in its central
administration offices, where Rabourdin proposed that they should live,
as in former days under the monarchy. Taking the sum of twelve thousand
francs a year for each official as an average, he estimated seven
millions as the cost of the whole body of such officials, which actually
stood at twenty in the budget.
By thus reducing the ministers to three heads he suppressed departments
which had come to be useless, together with the enormous costs of their
maintenance in Paris. He proved that an arrondissement could be managed
by ten men; a prefecture by a dozen at the most; which reduced the
entire civil service force throughout France to five thousand men,
exclusive of the departments of war and justice. Under this plan the
clerks of the court were charged with the system of loans, and the
ministry of the interior with that of registration and the management
of domains. Thus Rabourdin united in one centre all divisions that were
allied in nature. The mortgage system, inheritance, and registration did
not pass outside of their own sphere of action and only required three
additional clerks in the justice courts and three in the royal courts.
The steady application of this principle brought Rabourdin to reforms
in the finance system. He merged the collection of revenue into
one channel, taxing consumption in bulk instead of taxing property.
According to his ideas, consumption was the sole thing properly taxable
in times of peace. Land-taxes should always be held in reserve in case
of war; for then only could the State justly demand sacrifices from
the soil, which was in danger; but in times of peace it was a serious
political fault to burden it beyond a certain limit; otherwise it could
never be depended on in great emergencies. Thus a loan should be put on
the market when the country was tranquil, for at such times it could be
placed at par, instead of at fifty per cent loss as in bad times; in war
times resort should be had to a land-tax.
“The invasion of 1814 and 1815,” Rabourdin would say to his friends,
“founded in France and practically explained an institution which
neither Law nor Napoleon had been able to establish,--I mean Credit.”
Unfortunately, Xavier considered the true principles of this admirable
machine of civil service very little understood at the period when
he began his labor of reform in 1820. His scheme levied a toll on
the consumption by means of direct taxation and suppressed the whole
machinery of indirect taxation. The levying of the taxes was simplified
by a single classification of a great number of articles. This did away
with the more harassing customs at the gates of the cities, and obtained
the largest revenues from the remainder, by lessening the enormous
expense of collecting them. To lighten the burden of taxation is not, in
matters of finance, to diminish the taxes, but to assess them better; if
lightened, you increase the volume of business by giving it freer play;
the individual pays less and the State receives more. This reform, which
may seem immense, rests on very simple machinery. Rabourdin regarded
the tax on personal property as the most trustworthy representative of
general consumption. Individual fortunes are usually revealed in France
by rentals, by the number of servants, horses, carriages, and luxuries,
the costs of which are all to the interest of the public treasury.
Houses and what they contain vary comparatively but little, and are not
liable to disappear. After pointing out the means of making a tax-list
on personal property which should be more impartial than the existing
list, Rabourdin assessed the sums to be brought into the treasury by
indirect taxation as so much per cent on each individual share. A tax
is a levy of money on things or persons under disguises that are more or
less specious. These disguises, excellent when the object is to extort
money, become ridiculous in the present day, when the class on which the
taxes weigh the heaviest knows why the State imposes them and by what
machinery they are given back. In fact the budget is not a strong-box to
hold what is put into it, but a watering-pot; the more it takes in and
the more it pours out the better for the prosperity of the country.
Therefore, supposing there are six millions of tax-payers in easy
circumstances (Rabourdin proved their existence, including the rich) is
it not better to make them pay a duty on the consumption of wine, which
would not be more offensive than that on doors and windows and would
return a hundred millions, rather than harass them by taxing the thing
itself. By this system of taxation, each individual tax-payer pays less
in reality, while the State receives more, and consumers profit by a
vast reduction in the price of things which the State releases from its
perpetual and harassing interference. Rabourdin’s scheme retained a tax
on the cultivation of vineyards, so as to protect that industry from the
too great abundance of its own products. Then, to reach the consumption
of the poorer tax-payers, the licences of retail dealers were taxed
according to the population of the neighborhoods in which they lived.
In this way, the State would receive without cost or vexatious
hindrances an enormous revenue under three forms; namely, a duty on
wine, on the cultivation of vineyards, and on licenses, where now
an irritating array of taxes existed as a burden on itself and its
officials. Taxation was thus imposed upon the rich without overburdening
the poor. To give another example. Suppose a share assessed to each
person of one or two francs for the consumption of salt and you obtain
ten or a dozen millions; the modern “gabelle” disappears, the poor
breathe freer, agriculture is relieved, the State receives as much,
and no tax-payer complains. All persons, whether they belong to the
industrial classes or to the capitalists, will see at once the benefits
of a tax so assessed when they discover how commerce increases, and life
is ameliorated in the country districts. In short, the State will see
from year to year the number of her well-to-do tax-payers increasing. By
doing away with the machinery of indirect taxation, which is very costly
(a State, as it were, within a State), both the public finances and the
individual tax-payer are greatly benefited, not to speak of the saving
in costs of collecting.
The whole subject is indeed less a question of finance than a question
of government. The State should possess nothing of its own, neither
forests, nor mines, nor public works. That it should be the owner of
domains was, in Rabourdin’s opinion, an administrative contradiction.
The State cannot turn its possessions to profit and it deprives itself
of taxes; it thus loses two forms of production. As to the manufactories
of the government, they are just as unreasonable in the sphere of
industry. The State obtains products at a higher cost than those
of commerce, produces them more slowly, and loses its tax upon the
industry, the maintenance of which it, in turn, reduces. Can it be
thought a proper method of governing a country to manufacture instead
of promoting manufactures? to possess property instead of creating
more possessions and more diverse ones? In Rabourdin’s system the State
exacted no money security; he allowed only mortgage securities; and for
this reason: Either the State holds the security in specie, and that
embarrasses business and the movement of money; or it invests it at
a higher rate than the State itself pays, and that is a contemptible
robbery; or else it loses on the transaction, and that is folly;
moreover, if it is obliged at any time to dispose of a mass of these
securities it gives rises in certain cases to terrible bankruptcy.
The territorial tax did not entirely disappear in Rabourdin’s plan,--he
kept a minute portion of it as a point of departure in case of war;
but the productions of the soil were freed, and industry, finding raw
material at a low price, could compete with foreign nations without the
deceptive help of customs. The rich carried on the administration of the
provinces without compensation except that of receiving a peerage under
certain conditions. Magistrates, learned bodies, officers of the lower
grades found their services honorably rewarded; no man employed by the
government failed to obtain great consideration through the value and
extent of his labors and the excellence of his salary; every one was
able to provide for his own future and France was delivered from the
cancer of pensions. As a result Rabourdin’s scheme exhibited only
seven hundred millions of expenditures and twelve hundred millions of
receipts. A saving of five hundred millions annually had far more virtue
than the accumulation of a sinking fund whose dangers were plainly to
be seen. In that fund the State, according to Rabourdin, became
a stockholder, just as it persisted in being a land-holder and a
manufacturer. To bring about these reforms without too roughly jarring
the existing state of things or incurring a Saint-Bartholomew of
clerks, Rabourdin considered that an evolution of twenty years would be
required.
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『Bureaucracy』
Honoré de Balzac · 번역 Katharine Prescott Wormeley
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