During a long period of years preceding the Civil War, and through it,
let it here be explained and remembered, the city of Philadelphia had
been in the habit, as a corporation, when there were no available funds
in the treasury, of issuing what were known as city warrants, which
were nothing more than notes or I.O.U.’s bearing six per cent.
interest, and payable sometimes in thirty days, sometimes in three,
sometimes in six months—all depending on the amount and how soon the
city treasurer thought there would be sufficient money in the treasury
to take them up and cancel them. Small tradesmen and large contractors
were frequently paid in this way; the small tradesman who sold supplies
to the city institutions, for instance, being compelled to discount his
notes at the bank, if he needed ready money, usually for ninety cents
on the dollar, while the large contractor could afford to hold his and
wait. It can readily be seen that this might well work to the
disadvantage of the small dealer and merchant, and yet prove quite a
fine thing for a large contractor or note-broker, for the city was sure
to pay the warrants at some time, and six per cent. interest was a fat
rate, considering the absolute security. A banker or broker who
gathered up these things from small tradesmen at ninety cents on the
dollar made a fine thing of it all around if he could wait.
Originally, in all probability, there was no intention on the part of
the city treasurer to do any one an injustice, and it is likely that
there really were no funds to pay with at the time. However that may
have been, there was later no excuse for issuing the warrants, seeing
that the city might easily have been managed much more economically.
But these warrants, as can readily be imagined, had come to be a fine
source of profit for note-brokers, bankers, political financiers, and
inside political manipulators generally and so they remained a part of
the city’s fiscal policy.
There was just one drawback to all this. In order to get the full
advantage of this condition the large banker holding them must be an
“inside banker,” one close to the political forces of the city, for if
he was not and needed money and he carried his warrants to the city
treasurer, he would find that he could not get cash for them. But if he
transferred them to some banker or note-broker who was close to the
political force of the city, it was quite another matter. The treasury
would find means to pay. Or, if so desired by the note-broker or
banker—the right one—notes which were intended to be met in three
months, and should have been settled at that time, were extended to run
on years and years, drawing interest at six per cent. even when the
city had ample funds to meet them. Yet this meant, of course, an
illegal interest drain on the city, but that was all right also. “No
funds” could cover that. The general public did not know. It could not
find out. The newspapers were not at all vigilant, being pro-political.
There were no persistent, enthusiastic reformers who obtained any
political credence. During the war, warrants outstanding in this manner
arose in amount to much over two million dollars, all drawing six per
cent. interest, but then, of course, it began to get a little
scandalous. Besides, at least some of the investors began to want their
money back.
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📄 고전 원문 · 영어권 · 프로젝트 구텐베르크
『The Financier: A Novel』
Theodore Dreiser
199,377자 (원문이 길어 앞부분만 · 전체 1,093,604자) · 저작권 근거: 저작자 모두 1945년 이전 사망(한국 저작권 보호기간 끝) · 원문 출처
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