The philologist will have seen from the above how much the language
of the Vril-ya is akin to the Aryan or Indo-Germanic; but, like all
languages, it contains words and forms in which transfers from very
opposite sources of speech have been taken. The very title of Tur, which
they give to their supreme magistrate, indicates theft from a tongue
akin to the Turanian. They say themselves that this is a foreign word
borrowed from a title which their historical records show to have been
borne by the chief of a nation with whom the ancestors of the Vril-ya
were, in very remote periods, on friendly terms, but which has long
become extinct, and they say that when, after the discovery of vril,
they remodelled their political institutions, they expressly adopted a
title taken from an extinct race and a dead language for that of their
chief magistrate, in order to avoid all titles for that office with
which they had previous associations.
Should life be spared to me, I may collect into systematic form such
knowledge as I acquired of this language during my sojourn amongst the
Vril-ya. But what I have already said will perhaps suffice to show to
genuine philological students that a language which, preserving so many
of the roots in the aboriginal form, and clearing from the immediate,
but transitory, polysynthetical stage so many rude incumbrances, has
attained to such a union of simplicity and compass in its final
inflectional forms, must have been the gradual work of countless ages
and many varieties of mind ; that it contains the evidence of fusion
between congenial races, and necessitated, in arriving at the shape of
which I have given examples, the continuous culture of a highly
thoughtful people.
That, nevertheless, the literature which belongs to this language is a
literature of the past; that the present felicitous state of society at
which the Ana have attained forbids the progressive cultivation of
literature, especially in the two main divisions of fiction and history,
--I shall have occasion to show.
Chapter XIII.
This people have a religion, and, whatever may be said against it, at
least it has these strange peculiarities: firstly, that all believe in
the creed they profess; secondly, that they all practice the precepts
which the creed inculcates. They unite in the worship of one divine
Creator and Sustainer of the universe. They believe that it is one of
the properties of the all-permeating agency of vril, to transmit to
the well-spring of life and intelligence every thought that a living
creature can conceive; and though they do not contend that the idea of a
Diety is innate, yet they say that the An (man) is the only creature,
so far as their observation of nature extends, to whom ‘the capacity
of conceiving that idea,’ with all the trains of thought which open out
from it, is vouchsafed. They hold that this capacity is a privilege that
cannot have been given in vain, and hence that prayer and thanksgiving
are acceptable to the divine Creator, and necessary to the complete
development of the human creature. They offer their devotions both in
private and public. Not being considered one of their species, I was
not admitted into the building or temple in which the public worship is
rendered; but I am informed that the service is exceedingly short, and
unattended with any pomp of ceremony. It is a doctrine with the Vril-ya,
that earnest devotion or complete abstraction from the actual world
cannot, with benefit to itself, be maintained long at a stretch by the
human mind, especially in public, and that all attempts to do so either
lead to fanaticism or to hypocrisy. When they pray in private, it is
when they are alone or with their young children.
They say that in ancient times there was a great number of books written
upon speculations as to the nature of the Diety, and upon the forms of
belief or worship supposed to be most agreeable to Him. But these were
found to lead to such heated and angry disputations as not only to shake
the peace of the community and divide families before the most united,
but in the course of discussing the attributes of the Diety, the
existence of the Diety Himself became argued away, or, what was
worse, became invested with the passions and infirmities of the human
disputants. “For,” said my host, “since a finite being like an An cannot
possibly define the Infinite, so, when he endeavours to realise an idea
of the Divinity, he only reduces the Divinity into an An like himself.”
During the later ages, therefore, all theological speculations, though
not forbidden, have been so discouraged as to have fallen utterly
into disuse. The Vril-ya unite in a conviction of a future state, more
felicitous and more perfect than the present. If they have very vague
notions of the doctrine of rewards and punishments, it is perhaps
because they have no systems of rewards and punishments among
themselves, for there are no crimes to punish, and their moral standard
is so even that no An among them is, upon the whole, considered more
virtuous than another. If one excels, perhaps in one virtue, another
equally excels in some other virtue; If one has his prevalent fault or
infirmity, so also another has his. In fact, in their extraordinary
mode of life. There are so few temptations to wrong, that they are good
(according to their notions of goodness) merely because they live.
They have some fanciful notions upon the continuance of life, when once
bestowed, even in the vegetable world, as the reader will see in the
next chapter.
Chapter XIV.
Though, as I have said, the Vril-ya discourage all speculations on the
nature of the Supreme Being, they appear to concur in a belief by which
they think to solve that great problem of the existence of evil which
has so perplexed the philosophy of the upper world. They hold that
wherever He has once given life, with the perceptions of that life,
however faint it be, as in a plant, the life is never destroyed; it
passes into new and improved forms, though not in this planet (differing
therein from the ordinary doctrine of metempsychosis), and that the
living thing retains the sense of identity, so that it connects its past
life with its future, and is ‘conscious’ of its progressive improvement
in the scale of joy. For they say that, without this assumption, they
cannot, according to the lights of human reason vouchsafed to them,
discover the perfect justice which must be a constituent quality of the
All-Wise and the All-Good. Injustice, they say, can only emanate
from three causes: want of wisdom to perceive what is just, want of
benevolence to desire, want of power to fulfill it; and that each of
these three wants is incompatible in the All-Wise, the All-Good,
the All-Powerful. But that, while even in this life, the wisdom,
the benevolence, and the power of the Supreme Being are sufficiently
apparent to compel our recognition, the justice necessarily resulting
from those attributes, absolutely requires another life, not for man
only, but for every living thing of the inferior orders. That, alike in
the animal and the vegetable world, we see one individual rendered, by
circumstances beyond its control, exceedingly wretched compared to its
neighbours--one only exists as the prey of another--even a plant suffers
from disease till it perishes prematurely, while the plant next to it
rejoices in its vitality and lives out its happy life free from a pang.
That it is an erroneous analogy from human infirmities to reply by
saying that the Supreme Being only acts by general laws, thereby making
his own secondary causes so potent as to mar the essential kindness of
the First Cause; and a still meaner and more ignorant conception of the
All-Good, to dismiss with a brief contempt all consideration of justice
for the myriad forms into which He has infused life, and assume that
justice is only due to the single product of the An. There is no small
and no great in the eyes of the divine Life-Giver. But once grant that
nothing, however humble, which feels that it lives and suffers, can
perish through the series of ages, that all its suffering here, if
continuous from the moment of its birth to that of its transfer to
another form of being, would be more brief compared with eternity than
the cry of the new-born is compared to the whole life of a man; and once
suppose that this living thing retains its sense of identity when so
transformed (for without that sense it could be aware of no future
being), and though, indeed, the fulfilment of divine justice is removed
from the scope of our ken, yet we have a right to assume it to be
uniform and universal, and not varying and partial, as it would be
if acting only upon general and secondary laws; because such perfect
justice flows of necessity from perfectness of knowledge to conceive,
perfectness of love to will, and perfectness of power to complete it.
← 고전 원문 폴더
📄 고전 원문 · 영어권 · 프로젝트 구텐베르크
『다가오는 종족』
에드워드 불워 리턴 · 원제 The Coming Race
198,637자 (원문이 길어 앞부분만 · 전체 300,568자) · 저작권 근거: 저작자 모두 1873년 이전 사망(한국 저작권 보호기간 끝) · 원문 출처
내 자료함의 ‘📚 고전’ 글 폴더에 앞부분 2만 자가 담겨요. 회차 편집기의 ‘✦ 안드로메다 AI 이용하기 → 🖼️ 내 글·사진 분위기로 쓰기’에서 골라 이 고전의 분위기·문체를 참고해 쓸 수 있어요.