“For twenty years I served in Central Asia and I am able to judge, from
my own experience, of our position on the south frontier. In case of
a war with England, Afghanistan is the battle-ground of primary
importance. Three strategic passes lead from Afghanistan into India: the
Khyber Pass, the Bolan Pass, and the Kuram Valley. When, in 1878, the
English marched into Afghanistan they proceeded in three columns from
Peshawar, Kohat, and Quetta to Cabul, Ghazni, and Kandahar respectively.
These three roads have also been laid down as our lines of march. Public
opinion considers them the only possible routes. It would carry me too
far into detail were I to propound in this place my views as to the
‘pros and cons’ of this accepted view. In short, we SHALL find our way
into India. Hahibullah Khan would join us with his army, 60,000 strong,
as soon as we enter his territory. Of course, he is an ally of doubtful
integrity, for he would probably quite as readily join the English, were
they to anticipate us and make their appearance in his country with a
sufficiently imposing force. But nothing prevents our being first. Our
railway goes as far as Merv, seventy-five miles from Herat, and from
this central station to the Afghan frontier. With our trans-Caspian
railway we can bring the Caucasian army corps and the troops of
Turkestan to the Afghan frontier. I would undertake, within four weeks
of the outbreak of war, to mass a sufficient field army in Afghanistan
round Herat. Our first army can then be followed by a ceaseless stream
of regiments and batteries. The reserves of the Russian army are
inexhaustible, and we could place, if needs be, four million soldiers
and more than half a million of horses in the field. However, I am more
than doubtful whether England would meet us in Afghanistan. The English
generals would not, in any case, be well advised to leave India. Were
they defeated in Afghanistan only small fragments of their army at most
would escape back to India. The Afghans would show no mercy to a
fleeing English army and would destroy it, as has happened on a previous
occasion. If, on the other hand, which God forbid! the fortune of war
should turn against us, we should always find a line of retreat to
Turkestan open and be able to renew the attack at pleasure. If the
English army is defeated, then India is lost to Great Britain; for the
English are, in India, in the enemy’s country; as a defeated people they
will find no support in the Indian people. They would be attacked on all
sides by the Indian native chieftains, whose independence they have so
brutally destroyed, at the very moment that their power is broken. We,
on the other hand, should be received with open arms, as rescuers of the
Indian people from their intolerable yoke. The Anglo-Indian army looks
on paper much more formidable than it really is; its strength is put at
200,000 men, yet only one-third of this number are English soldiers, the
rest being composed of natives. This army, moreover, consists of four
divisions, which are scattered over the whole great territory of India.
A field army, for employment on the frontier or across it, cannot
possibly consist of more than 60,000 men; for, considering the
untrustworthiness of the population, the land cannot be denuded of its
garrisons. As a result of what I have said, I record my conviction that
the war will have to be waged in India itself, and that God will give us
the victory.”
The words of the General, spoken in an energetic and confident tone,
made a deep impression upon his hearers; only respect for the presence
of the Grand Dukes prevented applause. The greyhaired President gave the
Minister of War his hand, and invited the Minister for Foreign Affairs
to address them.
“In my opinion,” said the diplomatist, “there is no doubt that the
strategical opinions just delivered by His Excellency the Minister
for War are based upon an expert’s sound and correct estimate of the
circumstances, and I also am certain that the troops of His Majesty the
Tsar, accustomed as they are to victory, will, in the event of war, soon
be standing upon the plain of the Indus. It is also my firm conviction
that Russia would be best advised to take the offensive as soon as
ever the impossibility of our present relations to England has been
demonstrated. But whoever goes to war with England must not look to one
battleground alone. On the contrary, we must be prepared for attacks of
the most varied kinds, for an attack upon our finances, to begin with,
and upon our credit, as to which His Excellency Witte could give better
information than I could. The Bank of England, and the great banking
firms allied with it, would at once open this financial campaign.
Moreover, a ship sailing under the Russian flag would hardly dare show
itself on the open seas, and our international trade would, until our
enemy had been crushed, be absolutely at a standstill. Moreover, more
vital for us than considerations of this sort would be the question:
What of the attitude of the other great Powers? England’s political
art has, since the days of Oliver Cromwell, displayed itself chiefly in
adroitly making use of the continental Powers. It is no exaggeration to
say that England’s wars have been chiefly waged with continental armies.
This is not said in depreciation of England’s military powers. Wherever
the English fleet and English armies have been seen on the field of
battle, the energy, endurance, and intrepidity of their officers,
sailors, and soldiers have ever been brilliantly noticeable. The
traditions of the English troops who, under the Black Prince and Henry
V., marched in days of yore victorious through France, were again
green in the wars in the eighteenth century against France and against
Napoleon. Yet infinitely greater than her own military record has been
England’s success in persuading foreign countries to fight for her, and
in leading the troops of Austria, France, Germany, and Russia against
each other on the Continent. For the last two hundred years very few
wars have ever been waged without England’s co-operation, and without
her reaping the advantage. These few exceptions were the wars of
Bismarck, waged for the advantage and for the glory of his own country,
by which he earned the hatred of every good Englishman. While the
continent of Europe was racked by internal wars, which English diplomacy
had incited, Great Britain acquired her vast colonial possessions.
England has implicated us too in wars which redounded to her sole
advantage. I need only refer to the bloody, exhausting war of 1877-8,
and to the disastrous peace of San Stefano, where England’s intrigues
deprived us of the price of our victory over the Crescent. I refer,
further, to the Crimean War, in which a small English and a large French
army defeated us to the profit and advantage of England. That England,
and England alone, is again behind this attack upon us by Japan has been
dwelt upon by those who have already addressed you. Our enemies do not
see themselves called upon to depart in the slightest degree from a
policy that has so long stood them in such good stead, and it must,
therefore, be our policy to assure ourselves of the alliance, or at
least, where an alliance is unattainable, of the benevolent neutrality
of the other continental Powers in view of a war with England. To begin
with, as regards our ally, the French Republic, a satisfactory solution
of our task in this direction is already assured by the existing
treaties. Yet these treaties do not bind the French Government to
afford us military support in the case of a war which, in the eyes of
shortsighted observers, might perhaps be regarded as one which we had
ourselves provoked. We have accordingly opened negotiations through our
Ambassador with M. Delcasse, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs,
and with the President of the Republic himself. I have the supreme
satisfaction of being in a position to lay before you the result of
these negotiations in the form of a despatch just received from our
Ambassador in Paris. It runs, in the main, as follows: ‘I hasten to
inform Your Excellency that, in the name of the French Republic, M.
Delcasse has given me the solemn assurance that France will declare war
upon England at the moment His Majesty the Tsar has directed his armies
to march upon India. The considerations which have prompted the French
Government to take this step have been further explained to me by
M. Delcasse in our conference of this day, when he expressed himself
somewhat as follows: ‘Napoleon, a hundred years ago, perceived with rare
discernment that England was the real enemy of all continental nations,
and that the European continent could not pursue any other policy but to
combine in resisting that great pirate. The magnificent plan of Napoleon
was the alliance of France with Spain, Italy, Austria, Germany, and
Russia, in order to combat the rapacity of England. And he would, in
all probability, have carried his scheme through had it not been that
considerations of domestic policy determined the Tsar Alexander I., in
spite of his admiration for Napoleon’s ability, to run counter to the
latter’s intentions. The consequences of Napoleon’s defeat have shown
themselves sufficiently clearly during the past hundred years in
the enormous growth of the English power. The present political
constellation, which in many respects is very similar to that of the
year 1804, should be utilised to revive Napoleon’s plan once more.
Russia has, of course, the first and most vital interest in the downfall
of England, for, so long as Great Britain controls all the seas and all
the important coastlines, it is like a giant whose hands and feet are
fettered. Yet France is also checked in her natural development. Her
flourishing colonies in America and the Atlantic Ocean were wrested
from her in the eighteenth century. She was ousted by this overpowering
adversary from her settlements in the East Indies and--what the French
nation feels perhaps most acutely--Egypt, purchased for France by
the great Napoleon with the blood of his soldiers, was weaned away
by English gold and English intrigues. The Suez Canal, built by a
Frenchman, Lesseps, is in the possession of the English, facilitating
their communications with India, and securing them the sovereignty of
the world. France will accordingly make certain stipulations as the
price of its alliance--stipulations which are so loyal and equitable
that there is no question whatever of their not being agreed to on
the part of her ally, Russia. France demands that her possessions in
Tonking, Cochin China, Cambodia, Annam, and Laos shall be guaranteed;
that Russia be instrumental in assisting her to acquire Egypt, and that
it pledge itself to support the French policy in Tunis and the rest of
Africa.” In accordance with my instructions, I felt myself empowered
to assure M. Delcasse that his conditions were accepted on our side. In
answer to my question, whether a war with England would be popular in
France, the Minister said: “The French people will be ready for any
sacrifice if we make Fashoda our war-cry. British insolence never
showed itself more brutal and insulting than over this affair. Our brave
Marchand was on the spot with a superior force, and France was within
her rights. The simple demand of an English officer, who possessed
no other force but the moral one of the English flag, compelled us,
however, under the political circumstances which then obtained, to
abandon our righteous claims, and to recall our brave leader. How the
French people viewed this defeat has been plainly seen. The Parisians
gave Marchand a splendid ovation as a national hero, and the French
Government seriously contemplated the possibility of a revolution. We
are now in a position to take revenge for the humiliation which we then
endured, probably out of excessive prudence. If we inscribe the word
FASHODA on the tricolour there will no
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『The Coming Conquest of England』
August Niemann · 번역 John Henry Freese
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