“If we carry the problem higher, shall we not be like the Hindus, who
put the world upon a tortoise, the tortoise on an elephant, and do not
know on what the feet of their elephant may rest? This supreme will,
issuing from the contest between God and Matter, this God, this more
than God, can He have existed throughout eternity without willing what
He afterwards willed,--admitting that Eternity can be divided into two
eras. No matter where God is, what becomes of His intuitive intelligence
if He did not know His ultimate thought? Which, then, is the true
Eternity,--the created Eternity or the uncreated? But if God throughout
all time did will the world such as it is, this new necessity, which
harmonizes with the idea of sovereign intelligence, implies the
co-eternity of Matter. Whether Matter be co-eternal by a divine will
necessarily accordant with itself from the beginning, or whether
Matter be co-eternal of its own being, the power of God, which must be
absolute, perishes if His will is circumscribed; for in that case God
would find within Him a determining force which would control Him. Can
He be God if He can no more separate Himself from His creation in a past
eternity than in the coming eternity?
“This face of the problem is insoluble in its cause. Let us now inquire
into its effects. If a God compelled to have created the world from all
eternity seems inexplicable, He is quite as unintelligible in perpetual
cohesion with His work. God, constrained to live eternally united to His
creation is held down to His first position as workman. Can you conceive
of a God who shall be neither independent of nor dependent on His work?
Could He destroy that work without challenging Himself? Ask yourself,
and decide! Whether He destroys it some day, or whether He never
destroys it, either way is fatal to the attributes without which God
cannot exist. Is the world an experiment? is it a perishable form to
which destruction must come? If it is, is not God inconsistent and
impotent? inconsistent, because He ought to have seen the result before
the attempt,--moreover why should He delay to destroy that which He is
to destroy?--impotent, for how else could He have created an imperfect
man?
“If an imperfect creation contradicts the faculties which man attributes
to God we are forced back upon the question, Is creation perfect? The
idea is in harmony with that of a God supremely intelligent who could
make no mistakes; but then, what means the degradation of His work,
and its regeneration? Moreover, a perfect world is, necessarily,
indestructible; its forms would not perish, it could neither advance nor
recede, it would revolve in the everlasting circumference from which it
would never issue. In that case God would be dependent on His work;
it would be co-eternal with Him; and so we fall back into one of the
propositions most antagonistic to God. If the world is imperfect, it
can progress; if perfect, it is stationary. On the other hand, if it
be impossible to admit of a progressive God ignorant through a past
eternity of the results of His creative work, can there be a stationary
God? would not that imply the triumph of Matter? would it not be the
greatest of all negations? Under the first hypothesis God perishes
through weakness; under the second through the Force of his inertia.
“Therefore, to all sincere minds the supposition that Matter, in the
conception and execution of the worlds, is contemporaneous with God, is
to deny God. Forced to choose, in order to govern the nations, between
the two alternatives of the problem, whole generations have preferred
this solution of it. Hence the doctrine of the two principles of
Magianism, brought from Asia and adopted in Europe under the form of
Satan warring with the Eternal Father. But this religious formula and
the innumerable aspects of divinity that have sprung from it are surely
crimes against the Majesty Divine. What other term can we apply to
the belief which sets up as a rival to God a personification of Evil,
striving eternally against the Omnipotent Mind without the possibility
of ultimate triumph? Your statics declare that two Forces thus pitted
against each other are reciprocally rendered null.
“Do you turn back, therefore, to the other side of the problem, and say
that God pre-existed, original, alone?
“I will not go over the preceding arguments (which here return in full
force) as to the severance of Eternity into two parts; nor the questions
raised by the progression or the immobility of the worlds; let us
look only at the difficulties inherent to this second theory. If God
pre-existed alone, the world must have emanated from Him; Matter was
therefore drawn from His essence; consequently Matter in itself is
non-existent; all forms are veils to cover the Divine Spirit. If this
be so, the World is Eternal, and also it must be God. Is not this
proposition even more fatal than the former to the attributes conferred
on God by human reason? How can the actual condition of Matter be
explained if we suppose it to issue from the bosom of God and to be
ever united with Him? Is it possible to believe that the All-Powerful,
supremely good in His essence and in His faculties, has engendered
things dissimilar to Himself. Must He not in all things and through all
things be like unto Himself? Can there be in God certain evil parts
of which at some future day he may rid Himself?--a conjecture less
offensive and absurd than terrible, for the reason that it drags back
into Him the two principles which the preceding theory proved to be
inadmissible. God must be ONE; He cannot be divided without renouncing
the most important condition of His existence. It is therefore
impossible to admit of a fraction of God which yet is not God. This
hypothesis seemed so criminal to the Roman Church that she has made the
omnipresence of God in the least particles of the Eucharist an article
of faith.
“But how then can we imagine an omnipotent mind which does not triumph?
How associate it unless in triumph with Nature? But Nature is not
triumphant; she seeks, combines, remodels, dies, and is born again; she
is even more convulsed when creating than when all was fusion; Nature
suffers, groans, is ignorant, degenerates, does evil; deceives herself,
annihilates herself, disappears, and begins again. If God is associated
with Nature, how can we explain the inoperative indifference of the
divine principle? Wherefore death? How came it that Evil, king of
the earth, was born of a God supremely good in His essence and in His
faculties, who can produce nothing that is not made in His own image?
“But if, from this relentless conclusion which leads at once to
absurdity, we pass to details, what end are we to assign to the world?
If all is God, all is reciprocally cause and effect; all is _One_ as God
is _One_, and we can perceive neither points of likeness nor points of
difference. Can the real end be a rotation of Matter which subtilizes
and disappears? In whatever sense it were done, would not this
mechanical trick of Matter issuing from God and returning to God seem
a sort of child’s play? Why should God make himself gross with Matter?
Under which form is he most God? Which has the ascendant, Matter or
Spirit, when neither can in any way do wrong? Who can comprehend the
Deity engaged in this perpetual business, by which he divides Himself
into two Natures, one of which knows nothing, while the other knows all?
Can you conceive of God amusing Himself in the form of man, laughing at
His own efforts, dying Friday, to be born again Sunday, and continuing
this play from age to age, knowing the end from all eternity, and
telling nothing to Himself, the Creature, of what He the Creator, does?
The God of the preceding hypothesis, a God so nugatory by the very power
of His inertia, seems the more possible of the two if we are compelled
to choose between the impossibilities with which this God, so dull a
jester, fusillades Himself when two sections of humanity argue face to
face, weapons in hand.
“However absurd this outcome of the second problem may seem, it
was adopted by half the human race in the sunny lands where smiling
mythologies were created. Those amorous nations were consistent;
with them all was God, even Fear and its dastardy, even crime and its
bacchanals. If we accept pantheism,--the religion of many a great human
genius,--who shall say where the greater reason lies? Is it with the
savage, free in the desert, clothed in his nudity, listening to the sun,
talking to the sea, sublime and always true in his deeds whatever they
may be; or shall we find it in civilized man, who derives his chief
enjoyments through lies; who wrings Nature and all her resources to put
a musket on his shoulder; who employs his intellect to hasten the hour
of his death and to create diseases out of pleasures? When the rake of
pestilence and the ploughshare of war and the demon of desolation have
passed over a corner of the globe and obliterated all things, who will
be found to have the greater reason,--the Nubian savage or the patrician
of Thebes? Your doubts descend the scale, they go from heights to
depths, they embrace all, the end as well as the means.
“But if the physical world seems inexplicable, the moral world presents
still stronger arguments against God. Where, then, is progress? If all
things are indeed moving toward perfection why do we die young? why do
not nations perpetuate themselves? The world having issued from God and
being contained in God can it be stationary? Do we live once, or do
we live always? If we live once, hurried onward by the march of the
Great-Whole, a knowledge of which has not been given to us, let us act
as we please. If we are eternal, let things take their course. Is the
created being guilty if he exists at the instant of the transitions? If
he sins at the moment of a great transformation will he be punished for
it after being its victim? What becomes of the Divine goodness if we are
not transferred to the regions of the blest--should any such exist?
What becomes of God’s prescience if He is ignorant of the results of the
trials to which He subjects us? What is this alternative offered to man
by all religions,--either to boil in some eternal cauldron or to walk
in white robes, a palm in his hand and a halo round his head? Can it
be that this pagan invention is the final word of God? Where is the
generous soul who does not feel that the calculating virtue which seeks
the eternity of pleasure offered by all religions to whoever fulfils
at stray moments certain fanciful and often unnatural conditions, is
unworthy of man and of God? Is it not a mockery to give to man impetuous
senses and forbid him to satisfy them? Besides, what mean these ascetic
objections if Good and Evil are equally abolished? Does Evil exist?
If substance in all its forms is God, then Evil is God. The faculty of
reasoning as well as the faculty of feeling having been given to man
to use, nothing can be more excusable in him than to seek to know the
meaning of human suffering and the prospects of the future.
“If these rigid and rigorous arguments lead to such conclusions
confusion must reign. The world would have no fixedness; nothing
would advance, nothing would pause, all would change, nothing would be
destroyed, all would reappear after self-renovation; for if your mind
does not clearly demonstrate to you an end, it is equally impossible to
demonstrate the destruction of the smallest particle of Matter; Matter
can transform but not annihilate itself.
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📄 고전 원문 · 영어권 · 프로젝트 구텐베르크
『Seraphita』
Honoré de Balzac · 번역 Katharine Prescott Wormeley
199,103자 (원문이 길어 앞부분만 · 전체 293,376자) · 저작권 근거: 저작자 모두 1908년 이전 사망(한국 저작권 보호기간 끝) · 원문 출처
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