“But I will enlarge no further upon things that are themselves so
obvious. You may say that it is not your fault. The answer is ready
enough at hand, and it amounts to this—that if you had been born of
healthy and well-to-do parents, and been well taken care of when you
were a child, you would never have offended against the laws of your
country, nor found yourself in your present disgraceful position. If
you tell me that you had no hand in your parentage and education, and
that it is therefore unjust to lay these things to your charge, I
answer that whether your being in a consumption is your fault or no, it
is a fault in you, and it is my duty to see that against such faults as
this the commonwealth shall be protected. You may say that it is your
misfortune to be criminal; I answer that it is your crime to be
unfortunate.
“Lastly, I should point out that even though the jury had acquitted
you—a supposition that I cannot seriously entertain—I should have felt
it my duty to inflict a sentence hardly less severe than that which I
must pass at present; for the more you had been found guiltless of the
crime imputed to you, the more you would have been found guilty of one
hardly less heinous—I mean the crime of having been maligned unjustly.
“I do not hesitate therefore to sentence you to imprisonment, with hard
labour, for the rest of your miserable existence. During that period I
would earnestly entreat you to repent of the wrongs you have done
already, and to entirely reform the constitution of your whole body. I
entertain but little hope that you will pay attention to my advice; you
are already far too abandoned. Did it rest with myself, I should add
nothing in mitigation of the sentence which I have passed, but it is
the merciful provision of the law that even the most hardened criminal
shall be allowed some one of the three official remedies, which is to
be prescribed at the time of his conviction. I shall therefore order
that you receive two tablespoonfuls of castor oil daily, until the
pleasure of the court be further known.”
When the sentence was concluded the prisoner acknowledged in a few
scarcely audible words that he was justly punished, and that he had had
a fair trial. He was then removed to the prison from which he was never
to return. There was a second attempt at applause when the judge had
finished speaking, but as before it was at once repressed; and though
the feeling of the court was strongly against the prisoner, there was
no show of any violence against him, if one may except a little hooting
from the bystanders when he was being removed in the prisoners’ van.
Indeed, nothing struck me more during my whole sojourn in the country,
than the general respect for law and order.
CHAPTER XII. MALCONTENTS
I confess that I felt rather unhappy when I got home, and thought more
closely over the trial that I had just witnessed. For the time I was
carried away by the opinion of those among whom I was. They had no
misgivings about what they were doing. There did not seem to be a
person in the whole court who had the smallest doubt but that all was
exactly as it should be. This universal unsuspecting confidence was
imparted by sympathy to myself, in spite of all my training in opinions
so widely different. So it is with most of us: that which we observe to
be taken as a matter of course by those around us, we take as a matter
of course ourselves. And after all, it is our duty to do this, save
upon grave occasion.
But when I was alone, and began to think the trial over, it certainly
did strike me as betraying a strange and untenable position. Had the
judge said that he acknowledged the probable truth, namely, that the
prisoner was born of unhealthy parents, or had been starved in infancy,
or had met with some accidents which had developed consumption; and had
he then gone on to say that though he knew all this, and bitterly
regretted that the protection of society obliged him to inflict
additional pain on one who had suffered so much already, yet that there
was no help for it, I could have understood the position, however
mistaken I might have thought it. The judge was fully persuaded that
the infliction of pain upon the weak and sickly was the only means of
preventing weakness and sickliness from spreading, and that ten times
the suffering now inflicted upon the accused was eventually warded off
from others by the present apparent severity. I could therefore
perfectly understand his inflicting whatever pain he might consider
necessary in order to prevent so bad an example from spreading further
and lowering the Erewhonian standard; but it seemed almost childish to
tell the prisoner that he could have been in good health, if he had
been more fortunate in his constitution, and been exposed to less
hardships when he was a boy.
I write with great diffidence, but it seems to me that there is no
unfairness in punishing people for their misfortunes, or rewarding them
for their sheer good luck: it is the normal condition of human life
that this should be done, and no right-minded person will complain of
being subjected to the common treatment. There is no alternative open
to us. It is idle to say that men are not responsible for their
misfortunes. What is responsibility? Surely to be responsible means to
be liable to have to give an answer should it be demanded, and all
things which live are responsible for their lives and actions should
society see fit to question them through the mouth of its authorised
agent.
What is the offence of a lamb that we should rear it, and tend it, and
lull it into security, for the express purpose of killing it? Its
offence is the misfortune of being something which society wants to
eat, and which cannot defend itself. This is ample. Who shall limit the
right of society except society itself? And what consideration for the
individual is tolerable unless society be the gainer thereby? Wherefore
should a man be so richly rewarded for having been son to a
millionaire, were it not clearly provable that the common welfare is
thus better furthered? We cannot seriously detract from a man’s merit
in having been the son of a rich father without imperilling our own
tenure of things which we do not wish to jeopardise; if this were
otherwise we should not let him keep his money for a single hour; we
would have it ourselves at once. For property is robbery, but then, we
are all robbers or would-be robbers together, and have found it
essential to organise our thieving, as we have found it necessary to
organise our lust and our revenge. Property, marriage, the law; as the
bed to the river, so rule and convention to the instinct; and woe to
him who tampers with the banks while the flood is flowing.
But to return. Even in England a man on board a ship with yellow fever
is held responsible for his mischance, no matter what his being kept in
quarantine may cost him. He may catch the fever and die; we cannot help
it; he must take his chance as other people do; but surely it would be
desperate unkindness to add contumely to our self-protection, unless,
indeed, we believe that contumely is one of our best means of
self-protection. Again, take the case of maniacs. We say that they are
irresponsible for their actions, but we take good care, or ought to
take good care, that they shall answer to us for their insanity, and we
imprison them in what we call an asylum (that modern sanctuary!) if we
do not like their answers. This is a strange kind of irresponsibility.
What we ought to say is that we can afford to be satisfied with a less
satisfactory answer from a lunatic than from one who is not mad,
because lunacy is less infectious than crime.
We kill a serpent if we go in danger by it, simply for being such and
such a serpent in such and such a place; but we never say that the
serpent has only itself to blame for not having been a harmless
creature. Its crime is that of being the thing which it is: but this is
a capital offence, and we are right in killing it out of the way,
unless we think it more danger to do so than to let it escape;
nevertheless we pity the creature, even though we kill it.
But in the case of him whose trial I have described above, it was
impossible that any one in the court should not have known that it was
but by an accident of birth and circumstances that he was not himself
also in a consumption; and yet none thought that it disgraced them to
hear the judge give vent to the most cruel truisms about him. The judge
himself was a kind and thoughtful person. He was a man of magnificent
and benign presence. He was evidently of an iron constitution, and his
face wore an expression of the maturest wisdom and experience; yet for
all this, old and learned as he was, he could not see things which one
would have thought would have been apparent even to a child. He could
not emancipate himself from, nay, it did not even occur to him to feel,
the bondage of the ideas in which he had been born and bred.
So was it also with the jury and bystanders; and—most wonderful of
all—so was it even with the prisoner. Throughout he seemed fully
impressed with the notion that he was being dealt with justly: he saw
nothing wanton in his being told by the judge that he was to be
punished, not so much as a necessary protection to society (although
this was not entirely lost sight of), as because he had not been better
born and bred than he was. But this led me to hope that he suffered
less than he would have done if he had seen the matter in the same
light that I did. And, after all, justice is relative.
I may here mention that only a few years before my arrival in the
country, the treatment of all convicted invalids had been much more
barbarous than now, for no physical remedy was provided, and prisoners
were put to the severest labour in all sorts of weather, so that most
of them soon succumbed to the extreme hardships which they suffered;
this was supposed to be beneficial in some ways, inasmuch as it put the
country to less expense for the maintenance of its criminal class; but
the growth of luxury had induced a relaxation of the old severity, and
a sensitive age would no longer tolerate what appeared to be an excess
of rigour, even towards the most guilty; moreover, it was found that
juries were less willing to convict, and justice was often cheated
because there was no alternative between virtually condemning a man to
death and letting him go free; it was also held that the country paid
in recommittals for its over-severity; for those who had been
imprisoned even for trifling ailments were often permanently disabled
by their imprisonment; and when a man had been once convicted, it was
probable that he would seldom afterwards be off the hands of the
country.
These evils had long been apparent and recognised; yet people were too
indolent, and too indifferent to suffering not their own, to bestir
themselves about putting an end to them, until at last a benevolent
reformer devoted his whole life to effecting the necessary changes. He
divided all illnesses into three classes—those affecting the head, the
trunk, and the lower limbs—and obtained an enactment that all diseases
of the head, whether internal or external, should be treated with
laudanum, those of the body with castor-oil, and those of the lower
limbs with an embrocation of strong sulphuric acid and water.
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