First, truly, a man might maliciously object that Plato, being a
philosopher, was a natural enemy of poets. For, indeed, after the
philosophers had picked out of the sweet mysteries of poetry the right
discerning of true points of knowledge, they forthwith, putting it in
method, and making a school of art of that which the poets did only teach
by a divine delightfulness, beginning to spurn at their guides, like
ungrateful apprentices, were not content to set up shop for themselves,
but sought by all means to discredit their masters; which, by the force
of delight being barred them, the less they could overthrow them, the
more they hated them. For, indeed, they found for Homer seven cities
strove who should have him for their citizen, where many cities banished
philosophers as not fit members to live among them. For only repeating
certain of Euripides’ verses many Athenians had their lives saved of the
Syracusans, where the Athenians themselves thought many of the
philosophers unworthy to live. Certain poets, as Simonides and Pindar,
had so prevailed with Hiero the First, that of a tyrant they made him a
just king; where Plato could do so little with Dionysius that he himself,
of a philosopher, was made a slave. But who should do thus, I confess,
should requite the objections raised against poets with like cavillations
against philosophers; as likewise one should do that should bid one read
Phædrus or Symposium in Plato, or the discourse of Love in Plutarch, and
see whether any poet do authorise abominable filthiness as they do.
Again, a man might ask, out of what Commonwealth Plato doth banish them?
In sooth, thence where he himself alloweth community of women. So, as
belike this banishment grew not for effeminate wantonness, since little
should poetical sonnets be hurtful, when a man might have what woman he
listed. But I honour philosophical instructions, and bless the wits
which bred them, so as they be not abused, which is likewise stretched to
poetry. Saint Paul himself sets a watchword upon philosophy, indeed upon
the abuse. So doth Plato upon the abuse, not upon poetry. Plato found
fault that the poets of his time filled the world with wrong opinions of
the gods, making light tales of that unspotted essence, and therefore
would not have the youth depraved with such opinions. Herein may much be
said; let this suffice: the poets did not induce such opinions, but did
imitate those opinions already induced. For all the Greek stories can
well testify that the very religion of that time stood upon many and
many-fashioned gods; not taught so by poets, but followed according to
their nature of imitation. Who list may read in Plutarch the discourses
of Isis and Osiris, of the cause why oracles ceased, of the Divine
providence, and see whether the theology of that nation stood not upon
such dreams, which the poets indeed superstitiously observed; and truly,
since they had not the light of Christ, did much better in it than the
philosophers, who, shaking off superstition, brought in atheism.
Plato, therefore, whose authority I had much rather justly construe than
unjustly resist, meant not in general of poets, in those words of which
Julius Scaliger saith, “qua authoritate, barbari quidam atque insipidi,
abuti velint ad poetas e republicâ exigendos {71}:” but only meant to
drive out those wrong opinions of the Deity, whereof now, without farther
law, Christianity hath taken away all the hurtful belief, perchance as he
thought nourished by then esteemed poets. And a man need go no farther
than to Plato himself to know his meaning; who, in his dialogue called
“Ion,” {72} giveth high, and rightly, divine commendation unto poetry.
So as Plato, banishing the abuse, not the thing, not banishing it, but
giving due honour to it, shall be our patron, and not our adversary.
For, indeed, I had much rather, since truly I may do it, show their
mistaking of Plato, under whose lion’s skin they would make an ass-like
braying against poesy, than go about to overthrow his authority; whom,
the wiser a man is, the more just cause he shall find to have in
admiration; especially since he attributeth unto poesy more than myself
do, namely, to be a very inspiring of a divine force, far above man’s
wit, as in the fore-named dialogue is apparent.
Of the other side, who would show the honours have been by the best sort
of judgments granted them, a whole sea of examples would present
themselves; Alexanders, Cæsars, Scipios, all favourers of poets; Lælius,
called the Roman Socrates, himself a poet; so as part of
Heautontimeroumenos, in Terence, was supposed to be made by him. And
even the Greek Socrates, whom Apollo confirmed to be the only wise man,
is said to have spent part of his old time in putting Æsop’s Fables into
verse; and, therefore, full evil should it become his scholar Plato to
put such words in his master’s mouth against poets. But what needs more?
Aristotle writes the “Art of Poesy;” and why, if it should not be
written? Plutarch teacheth the use to be gathered of them; and how, if
they should not be read? And who reads Plutarch’s either history or
philosophy, shall find he trimmeth both their garments with guards {73}
of poesy.
But I list not to defend poesy with the help of his underling
historiographer. Let it suffice to have showed it is a fit soil for
praise to dwell upon; and what dispraise may be set upon it is either
easily overcome, or transformed into just commendation. So that since
the excellences of it may be so easily and so justly confirmed, and the
low creeping objections so soon trodden down {74}; it not being an art of
lies, but of true doctrine; not of effeminateness, but of notable
stirring of courage; not of abusing man’s wit, but of strengthening man’s
wit; not banished, but honoured by Plato; let us rather plant more
laurels for to ingarland the poets’ heads (which honour of being
laureate, as besides them only triumphant captains were, is a sufficient
authority to show the price they ought to be held in) than suffer the
ill-favoured breath of such wrong speakers once to blow upon the clear
springs of poesy.
But {75} since I have run so long a career in this matter, methinks,
before I give my pen a full stop, it shall be but a little more lost time
to inquire, why England, the mother of excellent minds, should be grown
so hard a step-mother to poets, who certainly in wit ought to pass all
others, since all only proceeds from their wit, being, indeed, makers of
themselves, not takers of others. How can I but exclaim,
“Musa, mihi causas memora, quo numine læso?” {76}
Sweet poesy! that hath anciently had kings, emperors, senators, great
captains, such as, besides a thousand others, David, Adrian, Sophocles,
Germanicus, not only to favour poets, but to be poets; and of our nearer
times can present for her patrons, a Robert, King of Sicily; the great
King Francis of France; King James of Scotland; such cardinals as Bembus
and Bibiena; such famous preachers and teachers as Beza and Melancthon;
so learned philosophers as Fracastorius and Scaliger; so great orators as
Pontanus and Muretus; so piercing wits as George Buchanan; so grave
councillors as, besides many, but before all, that Hospital {77} of
France, than whom, I think, that realm never brought forth a more
accomplished judgment more firmly builded upon virtue; I say these, with
numbers of others, not only to read others’ poesies, but to poetise for
others’ reading: that poesy, thus embraced in all other places, should
only find in our time a hard welcome in England, I think the very earth
laments it, and therefore decks our soil with fewer laurels than it was
accustomed. For heretofore poets have in England also flourished; and,
which is to be noted, even in those times when the trumpet of Mars did
sound loudest. And now that an over-faint quietness should seem to strew
the house for poets, they are almost in as good reputation as the
mountebanks at Venice. Truly, even that, as of the one side it giveth
great praise to poesy, which, like Venus (but to better purpose), had
rather be troubled in the net with Mars, than enjoy the homely quiet of
Vulcan; so serveth it for a piece of a reason why they are less grateful
to idle England, which now can scarce endure the pain of a pen. Upon
this necessarily followeth that base men with servile wits undertake it,
who think it enough if they can be rewarded of the printer; and so as
Epaminondas is said, with the honour of his virtue, to have made an
office by his exercising it, which before was contemptible, to become
highly respected; so these men, no more but setting their names to it, by
their own disgracefulness, disgrace the most graceful poesy. For now, as
if all the Muses were got with child, to bring forth bastard poets,
without any commission, they do post over the banks of Helicon, until
they make their readers more weary than post-horses; while, in the
meantime, they,
“Queis meliore luto finxit præcordia Titan,” {78}
are better content to suppress the outflowings of their wit, than by
publishing them to be accounted knights of the same order.
But I that, before ever I durst aspire unto the dignity, am admitted into
the company of the paper-blurrers, do find the very true cause of our
wanting estimation is want of desert, taking upon us to be poets in
despite of Pallas. Now, wherein we want desert, were a thankworthy
labour to express. But if I knew, I should have mended myself; but as I
never desired the title so have I neglected the means to come by it;
only, overmastered by some thoughts, I yielded an inky tribute unto them.
Marry, they that delight in poesy itself, should seek to know what they
do, and how they do, especially look themselves in an unflattering glass
of reason, if they be inclinable unto it.
For poesy must not be drawn by the ears, it must be gently led, or rather
it must lead; which was partly the cause that made the ancient learned
affirm it was a divine, and no human skill, since all other knowledges
lie ready for any that have strength of wit; a poet no industry can make,
if his own genius be not carried into it. And therefore is an old
proverb, “Orator fit, poeta nascitur.” {79} Yet confess I always, that
as the fertilest ground must be manured, so must the highest flying wit
have a Dædalus to guide him. That Dædalus, they say, both in this and in
other, hath three wings to bear itself up into the air of due
commendation; that is art, imitation, and exercise. But these, neither
artificial rules, nor imitative patterns, we much cumber ourselves
withal. Exercise, indeed, we do, but that very forebackwardly; for where
we should exercise to know, we exercise as having known; and so is our
brain delivered of much matter which never was begotten by knowledge.
For there being two principal parts, matter to be expressed by words, and
words to express the matter, in neither we use art or imitation rightly.
Our matter is “quodlibet,” {80} indeed, although wrongly, performing
Ovid’s verse,
“Quicquid conabor dicere, versus erit;” {81}
never marshalling it into any assured rank, that almost the readers
cannot tell where to find themselves.
← 고전 원문 폴더
📄 고전 원문 · 영어권 · 프로젝트 구텐베르크
『A Defence of Poesie and Poems』
Philip Sidney
185,085자 · 저작권 근거: 저작자 모두 1586년 이전 사망(한국 저작권 보호기간 끝) · 원문 출처
내 자료함의 ‘📚 고전’ 글 폴더에 앞부분 2만 자가 담겨요. 회차 편집기의 ‘✦ 안드로메다 AI 이용하기 → 🖼️ 내 글·사진 분위기로 쓰기’에서 골라 이 고전의 분위기·문체를 참고해 쓸 수 있어요.