To {66} the second, therefore, that they should be the principal liars, I
answer paradoxically, but truly, I think truly, that of all writers under
the sun, the poet is the least liar; and though he would, as a poet, can
scarcely be a liar. The astronomer, with his cousin the geometrician,
can hardly escape when they take upon them to measure the height of the
stars. How often, think you, do the physicians lie, when they aver
things good for sicknesses, which afterwards send Charon a great number
of souls drowned in a potion before they come to his ferry. And no less
of the rest which take upon them to affirm. Now for the poet, he nothing
affirmeth, and therefore never lieth; for, as I take it, to lie is to
affirm that to be true which is false: so as the other artists, and
especially the historian, affirmeth many things, can, in the cloudy
knowledge of mankind, hardly escape from many lies: but the poet, as I
said before, never affirmeth; the poet never maketh any circles about
your imagination, to conjure you to believe for true what he writeth: he
citeth not authorities of other histories, but even for his entry calleth
the sweet Muses to inspire into him a good invention; in troth, not
labouring to tell you what is or is not, but what should or should not
be. And, therefore, though he recount things not true, yet because he
telleth them not for true he lieth not; without we will say that Nathan
lied in his speech, before alleged, to David; which, as a wicked man
durst scarce say, so think I none so simple would say, that Æsop lied in
the tales of his beasts; for who thinketh that Æsop wrote it for actually
true, were well worthy to have his name chronicled among the beasts he
writeth of. What child is there that cometh to a play, and seeing Thebes
written in great letters upon an old door, doth believe that it is
Thebes? If then a man can arrive to the child’s age, to know that the
poet’s persons and doings are but pictures what should be, and not
stories what have been, they will never give the lie to things not
affirmatively, but allegorically and figuratively written; and therefore,
as in history, looking for truth, they may go away full fraught with
falsehood, so in poesy, looking but for fiction, they shall use the
narration but as an imaginative ground-plot of a profitable invention.
But hereto is replied, that the poets give names to men they write of,
which argueth a conceit of an actual truth, and so, not being true,
proveth a falsehood. And doth the lawyer lie then, when, under the names
of John of the Stile, and John of the Nokes, he putteth his case? But
that is easily answered, their naming of men is but to make their picture
the more lively, and not to build any history. Painting men, they cannot
leave men nameless; we see we cannot play at chess but that we must give
names to our chess-men: and yet, methinks, he were a very partial
champion of truth that would say we lied for giving a piece of wood the
reverend title of a bishop. The poet nameth Cyrus and Æneas no other way
than to show what men of their fames, fortunes, and estates should do.
Their {67} third is, how much it abuseth men’s wit, training it to a
wanton sinfulness and lustful love. For, indeed, that is the principal
if not only abuse I can hear alleged. They say the comedies rather
teach, than reprehend, amorous conceits; they say the lyric is larded
with passionate sonnets; the elegiac weeps the want of his mistress; and
that even to the heroical Cupid hath ambitiously climbed. Alas! Love, I
would thou couldst as well defend thyself, as thou canst offend others!
I would those on whom thou dost attend, could either put thee away or
yield good reason why they keep thee! But grant love of beauty to be a
beastly fault, although it be very hard, since only man, and no beast,
hath that gift to discern beauty; grant that lovely name of love to
deserve all hateful reproaches, although even some of my masters the
philosophers spent a good deal of their lamp-oil in setting forth the
excellency of it; grant, I say, what they will have granted, that not
only love, but lust, but vanity, but, if they list, scurrility, possess
many leaves of the poets’ books; yet, think I, when this is granted, they
will find their sentence may, with good manners, put the last words
foremost; and not say that poetry abuseth man’s wit, but that man’s wit
abuseth poetry. For I will not deny but that man’s wit may make poesy,
which should be φραστικὴ, which some learned have defined, figuring forth
good things, to be φανταστικὴ, which doth contrariwise infect the fancy
with unworthy objects; as the painter, who should give to the eye either
some excellent perspective, or some fine picture fit for building or
fortification, or containing in it some notable example, as Abraham
sacrificing his son Isaac, Judith killing Holofernes, David fighting with
Goliath, may leave those, and please an ill-pleased eye with wanton shows
of better-hidden matters.
But, what! shall the abuse of a thing make the right use odious? Nay,
truly, though I yield that poesy may not only be abused, but that being
abused, by the reason of his sweet charming force, it can do more hurt
than any other army of words, yet shall it be so far from concluding,
that the abuse shall give reproach to the abused, that, contrariwise, it
is a good reason, that whatsoever being abused, doth most harm, being
rightly used (and upon the right use each thing receives his title) doth
most good. Do we not see skill of physic, the best rampire {68} to our
often-assaulted bodies, being abused, teach poison, the most violent
destroyer? Doth not knowledge of law, whose end is to even and right all
things, being abused, grow the crooked fosterer of horrible injuries?
Doth not (to go in the highest) God’s word abused breed heresy, and His
name abused become blasphemy? Truly, a needle cannot do much hurt, and
as truly (with leave of ladies be it spoken) it cannot do much good.
With a sword thou mayest kill thy father, and with a sword thou mayest
defend thy prince and country; so that, as in their calling poets fathers
of lies, they said nothing, so in this their argument of abuse, they
prove the commendation.
They allege herewith, that before poets began to be in price, our nation
had set their heart’s delight upon action, and not imagination; rather
doing things worthy to be written, than writing things fit to be done.
What that before time was, I think scarcely Sphynx can tell; since no
memory is so ancient that gives not the precedence to poetry. And
certain it is, that, in our plainest homeliness, yet never was the Albion
nation without poetry. Marry, this argument, though it be levelled
against poetry, yet it is indeed a chain-shot against all learning or
bookishness, as they commonly term it. Of such mind were certain Goths,
of whom it is written, that having in the spoil of a famous city taken a
fair library, one hangman, belike fit to execute the fruits of their
wits, who had murdered a great number of bodies, would have set fire in
it. “No,” said another, very gravely, “take heed what you do, for while
they are busy about those toys, we shall with more leisure conquer their
countries.” This, indeed, is the ordinary doctrine of ignorance, and
many words sometimes I have heard spent in it; but because this reason is
generally against all learning as well as poetry, or rather all learning
but poetry; because it were too large a digression to handle it, or at
least too superfluous, since it is manifest that all government of action
is to be gotten by knowledge, and knowledge best by gathering many
knowledges, which is reading; I only say with Horace, to him that is of
that opinion,
“Jubeo stultum esse libenter—” {69}
for as for poetry itself, it is the freest from this, objection, for
poetry is the companion of camps. I dare undertake, Orlando Furioso, or
honest King Arthur, will never displease a soldier: but the quiddity of
“ens” and “prima materia” will hardly agree with a corslet. And,
therefore, as I said in the beginning, even Turks and Tartars are
delighted with poets. Homer, a Greek, flourished before Greece
flourished; and if to a slight conjecture a conjecture may be opposed,
truly it may seem, that as by him their learned men took almost their
first light of knowledge, so their active men receive their first notions
of courage. Only Alexander’s example may serve, who by Plutarch is
accounted of such virtue that fortune was not his guide but his
footstool; whose acts speak for him, though Plutarch did not; indeed, the
phoenix of warlike princes. This Alexander left his schoolmaster, living
Aristotle, behind him, but took dead Homer with him. He put the
philosopher Callisthenes to death, for his seeming philosophical, indeed
mutinous, stubbornness; but the chief thing he was ever heard to wish for
was that Homer had been alive. He well found he received more bravery of
mind by the pattern of Achilles, than by hearing the definition of
fortitude. And, therefore, if Cato misliked Fulvius for carrying Ennius
with him to the field, it may be answered that if Cato misliked it the
noble Fulvius liked it, or else he had not done it; for it was not the
excellent Cato Uticensis whose authority I would much more have
reverenced, but it was the former, in truth a bitter punisher of faults,
but else a man that had never sacrificed to the Graces. He misliked, and
cried out against, all Greek learning, and yet, being fourscore years
old, began to learn it, belike fearing that Pluto understood not Latin.
Indeed, the Roman laws allowed no person to be carried to the wars but he
that was in the soldiers’ roll. And, therefore, though Cato misliked his
unmustered person, he misliked not his work. And if he had, Scipio
Nasica (judged by common consent the best Roman) loved him: both the
other Scipio brothers, who had by their virtues no less surnames than of
Asia and Afric, so loved him that they caused his body to be buried in
their sepulture. So, as Cato’s authority being but against his person,
and that answered with so far greater than himself, is herein of no
validity.
But {70} now, indeed, my burthen is great, that Plato’s name is laid upon
me, whom, I must confess, of all philosophers I have ever esteemed most
worthy of reverence; and with good reason, since of all philosophers he
is the most poetical; yet if he will defile the fountain out of which his
flowing streams have proceeded, let us boldly examine with what reason he
did it.
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『A Defence of Poesie and Poems』
Philip Sidney
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